Distributive Politics in Competitive Vote Markets: Evidence from Uganda

• In Event: Clientelism and Formal Political Institutions in Developing Countries

Abstract

Does political competition deter clientelism by encouraging politicians to rely on public goods provision? While local public goods, in theory, is a more cost-effective strategy to generate political support among large groups, studies have found that political competition intensifies clientelism. This paper studies the question in Uganda where clientelism is widespread and political competition between candidates is increasing. We rely on the universe of public expenses, down to village-level, generated by national and sub-national governments between 2012 and 2018 (N=380,000). The official voter registers allow us to link villages to their respective polling station electoral results. The extent of clientelism is measured using a high density survey (N=30,000) collected during the 2016 general elections campaign. We identify effects of local political competition using a shift-share instrument leveraging how positive shifts in National Resistance Movement’s nationwide popularity increase local political competition in opposition districts, but decrease political competition in their strongholds.

Authors

• Horacio Alejandro Larreguy, Harvard University

• Anders Woller, University of Copenhagen