Spatial Inequality and Populist Voting in Germany and the U.S.

• In Event: Inequality and Voting Behavior

Abstract

Although having lost the latest U.S. presidential election, the number of votes won by populist Donald J. Trump still exceeded many expectations. Similarly, the populist German party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) experiences continuing support amongst voters. In explaining this support, research often focuses on economic and cultural changes as well as – especially in recent years - rising inequality, all usually associated with the direct effects of progressing globalization (see e.g., Margalit 2019; Mukand and Rodrik 2020; Rodrik 2018).

Surprisingly, populist voting in Germany and the United States is highest in less globalized regions that also show rather equal income distributions like Saxony and the Ruhr area in Germany as well as the Deep South and the Rust Belt states in the United States. These patterns are even more pronounced on the county level, with rural areas not directly affected by the forces of globalization displaying particularly high populist vote shares.

In the light of this finding, my paper addresses the research question of how this subnational variance in populist voting can be explained. The answer I propose has two components. In a first step I develop the concept of spatial inequality, which describes the regional inequality that arises as some counties strongly benefit from globalization while other less globalized counties are left behind. I argue that this globalization induced spatial inequality is a previously overlooked determinant of populist voting, as spatial inequality leads to societal polarization, which creates favorable conditions for the populist anti-elite/people-centrist rhetoric to resonate with voters. In a second step, I argue that this effect of spatial inequality on populist voting is mediated by the provision of public goods. This is because the inequality induced feeling of being left behind is reinforced by inadequate public good provision, making it a remedy against spatial inequality-based populist voting.

The mechanism I propose draws on an extensive body of globalization and inequality as well as populism research. Although previous research has found that globalization can reduce but also increase inequality (see e.g., Firebaugh 2003; Milanovic 2016; Wade 2004), many scholars point to a general patter: Globalization achieves a drop of inequality between nations, but inequality surges within nations because of the uneven spread of globalization benefits (Freeman 2011; Niño-Zarazúa, Roope, and Tarp 2017). In analyzing this uneven spread of benefits, the “losers” of globalization, i.e. people with low skills, directly affected by globalization, are usually suspected to vote for anti-globalization populist actors (see e.g., Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017; Kriesi and Pappas 2016).

While the early research concerned with the determinants of populism has often focused on the socioeconomic predispositions and economic insecurities of these “losers” of globalization (see e.g., Swank and Betz 2003) more recent work has shifted the focus away from individual socioeconomic predispositions and towards the relationship between populist voting and rising inequality within nations (see Pastor and Veronesi 2019). However, due to conceptual and definitional ambiguities, this relationship between inequality and populist voting has to be clearly established. Additionally, previous research has mainly focused on the direct effect of globalization on nations as a whole and ignored indirect effects of globalization especially at the subnational level.

I address this research gap by developing the concept of globalization induced spatial inequality and introducing it as an important component in explaining subnational variance in populist support. In doing so, I shift the focus away from socioeconomic predispositions as well as the direct effect of globalization and absolute inequality within regions towards relative inequality between these regions and thereby the indirect effect of globalization. Further, I draw on recent economic research and argue that the provision of public goods mediates the effect of spatial inequality on populist voting (see Diermeier 2020). To test my arguments, I use county level data from Germany and the United States to development county-specific spatial inequality and public good provision scores. In using these scores to analyze the 2017 federal election in Germany and the 2016 presidential election in the United States, I already find that spatial inequality is strongly correlated with populist voting and that the impact of spatial inequality on populist voting is mediated by the provision of public goods.

Author

• Michael Bayerlein, University of Kiel