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Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

Fri, October 1, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Constitutional amendment rules tend to be more rigorous than the normal legislative process. This design choice has two important and interrelated consequences: constitutional amendment occurs less frequently than the adoption of new policies, making the risks associated with constitutional change higher. Existing scholarship on constitutional amendment rates have emphasized the variation in the rigidity of amendment procedures (Lutz, 1994; Tsebelis, N.d.) or the state's constitutional culture (Ginsburg and Melton, 2015; Versteeg and Zackin, 2016). As insightful as these approaches are, each leaves major questions unanswered. Institutional scholarship cannot explain the variation over time within states that have not changed their amendment rules or variation between states with near-identical amendment procedures. The literature is also unclear on what forces shape constitutional culture, why it changes over time, and whether it is endogenous to amendment rules (Albert, 2019).

This paper makes a contribution to both strands of literature by analyzing constitutional amendment rates as an interaction between social forces and institutional rules. Specifically, we theorize that increased social capital creates a political environment in which iti is easier to navigate amendment procedures. At the mass level, social capital increases social and political trust (Li, Pickles and Savage, 2005; Rahn and Rudolph, 2005). At the elite level, social capital is associated with improvements in government performance and legislative collegiality (Putnam, 1993; Lawless, Theriault, and Guthrie, 2018). Thus, we predict the increase in reciprocity produced by social capital mitigates the risk associated with constitutional change.

Our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we examine amendment rates cross-nationally, using national-level measures of social capital gathered from the World Values Survey. The data indicate that amendment frequency is a function of institutional rules, levels of social trust, political trust, and group participation. Next, we turn to the American case at the national and subnational levels. We find that amendments to the U.S. Constitution are more likely to advance towards ratification in years when group participation rates are stronger and Americans express higher levels of political trust. Finally, the determinants of U.S. state constitutional amendment rates are similar to those uncovered in the cross-national analysis. While procedural rigidity reduces amendment frequency, state-level measures of group participation and state governmental trust are positively associated with constitutional change.

References

Albert, Richard. 2019. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford University Press.

Ginsburg, Tom and James Melton. 2015. “Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13(3):686–713.

Lawless, Jennifer L., Sean M. Theriault and Samantha Guthrie. 2018. “Nice Girls? Sex, Collegiality, and Bipartisan Cooperation in the US Congress.” Journal of Politics 80(4):1268–1282.

Li, Yaojun, Andrew Pickles and Mike Savage. 2005. “Social Capital and Social Trust in Britain.” European Sociological Review 21(2):109–123.

Lutz, Donald S. 1994. “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment.” American Political Science Review 88(2):355–370.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press.

Rahn, Wendy M. and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2005. “A Tale of Political Trust in American Cities.” Public Opinion Quarterly 69(4):530–560.

Tsebelis, George. N.d. “Constitutional Rigidity Matters.” British Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming. https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/tsebelis/wp-content/uploads/sites/246/2020/07/Constitutional-Rigidity-Matters.pdf

Versteeg, Mila and Emily Zackin. 2016. “Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design.” American Political Science Review 110(4):657–674.

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