Spoiling Support for Peace Processes?

• In Event: Transitioning From Conflict to Peace: The Case of Colombia

Abstract

Considering the stability of peace processes and, especially, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of fighters, all actors are theorized to be watching the others to react during the crucial implementation period. Spoilers, particularly defectors from a settlement who return to conflict, seek to signal dissatisfaction with the politics of this transition and, potentially, sway different audiences including average citizens to derail broader DDR and the peace process. We study the role of spoilers in peace agreements, and, specifically, we examine high-level rebel defectors during the period of implementation, including of disarmament provisions. We theorize about the role in politics of defectors, who often seek to erode trust during the implementation of a peace agreement (Stedman 1997); defectors often justify their decision to violate a peace process by arguing that a lack of guarantees and poor implementation void the bargain – and they attempt to sway public opinion in order to upset the broader peace agreement. We develop a set of hypotheses on whether the existence of spoilers of the peace agreement affect: a) citizens’ expectations about the extent to which rebels involved in the settlement will follow through with their commitment to the accord; b) citizens’ attitudes towards reconciliation and reincorporation of ex-rebels into civilian life; but also potentially, c) citizens' expectations about the government's role in keeping the peace depending on their performance so far. Using a unique opportunity – we were fielding in survey Colombia when a defecting group emerged from the recent settlement there – we conducted a priming and messaging experiment to assess these hypotheses. The sample for our survey experiment includes 4,000 individuals, distributed across 80 municipalities in Colombia, and our sampling procedure selects for variation in conflict exposure. In fact, in order to assess differences produced by past conflict exposure, we conduct a matched-pair sampling procedure, where we matches a total of 95 pairs or 190 municipalities on a number of indicators but with differences in armed attacks, and then randomly sampled 40 pairs or 80 municipalities, providing us variation. We do find that citizens' attitudes toward the rebels and especially reintegration change – potentially upsetting the peace process – but that some blame also lands on the government in particular when citizens are reminded about past performance.

Authors

• Aila M. Matanock, University of California-Berkeley

• Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, European University Institute

• Miguel Garcia-Sanchez