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In Event: The Local Politics of Service Provision in the Middle East and North Africa (Pre-Recorded)
How do center-periphery ties shape patterns of local service provision and electoral accountability? This paper argues that strong ties to Lebanon's governing regime - a multi-party cartel - are a necessary precondition to public goods provision. The paper relies on qualitative evidence from 142 interviews conducted over several years of fieldwork in Lebanon. It employs a comparative case study of two urban municipalities, Sidon and Tripoli, with analogous pre-war politics and similar sectarian demographics. Using this case comparison and a shadow set of cases, it shows that party cartel-dominated cities are characterized by more effective mechanisms of candidate selection for municipal office. Parties select more reliably loyal agents to serve on their behalf in the local government, who then leverage partisan ties to provide public goods to their municipalities. The paper also details the implications of party cartel control for local elite predation. It then discusses how even once-resistant local governments in Lebanon have gradually submitted to an equilibrium of party co-optation. It concludes that punishment via withdrawal of state resources has been a key strategy of the Lebanese regime to extinguish local opposition.