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How can states prevent armed groups from exploiting local governance gaps to (re)establish territorial control during transitions to national peace? We report results from an experimental evaluation of the ComunPaz program, a scalable, inexpensive intervention that sought to displace mechanisms of rebel governance by harnessing complementarities between state and communal institutions and improving the quality of security and justice provision in areas once dominated by FARC, Colombia's largest rebel group. We find that ComunPaz improved the quality of dispute resolution at the local level, increased citizens' trust in (some) state institutions, and strengthened coordination between state and communal authorities. We also find suggestive evidence that the program reduced citizens' trust in, and reliance on, armed groups. The program did not, however, increase reliance on either state or communal authorities to resolve disputes, nor did it increase citizens' trust in communal institutions. We discuss the implications of our findings for peacebuilding and state-building in countries transitioning out of civil war.