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Vast literature studies secondary bond markets, and governments’ willingness to repay debts. Less attention was given to sovereign debt management in primary markets. We argue that formal autonomy of Debt Management Offices (DMOs) from political decision-makers improves the government’s ability to service and repay its debt. We introduce a new country-year dataset of DMO legislation for 75 developing and developed democratic countries in the period 1950-2013. Logit and ologit regressions confirm that DMO autonomy is likelier following debt defaults, high inflation, high debts and IMF prior conditions. Brazil and Slovakia serve as case studies. A Heckman correction procedure confirms that DMO autonomy increases sovereign debt credibility. Our study is innovative in explaining the causes of formal autonomy of DMOs, evaluating the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on it, demonstrating its effect on sovereign credibility, and coding it over such an extensive scope of countries and years.