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The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This last provision of the Bill of Rights is generally (and rightly) regarded as an essential component of the American system of federalism. But is that all it is? Scholars such as Akhil Amar argue that this distinction is an expression of the founders’ republicanism, providing protection for the sovereign people to control their government (The Bill of Rights, 1998). “The people” as the sovereign retain powers they have not delegated to the federal government or to their state governments.
In addition to federalism and popular sovereignty, might this provision also be an essential component of limited government, shielding civil society from federal as well as state power? The wording of the Tenth Amendment indicates a distinction not only between federal and state powers, but between the authority of the governments in general and that of “the people.” Rather than thinking of this provision as merely a reference to popular sovereignty, a passive authority retained by the people until it is activated in a delegation to government, this paper explores the liberal nature of that provision, seeing there not republicanism per se, but a Lockean distinction between society and politics. Under this liberal understanding, the Tenth Amendment makes a distinction between the public and private realms, the political power of the states and the federal government as separate from the social authorities established by “the people” acting in their private capacities. It considers whether we can read the “the people” in this context as what would later be known as “civil society.”
This understanding does not dismiss Amar’s popular soveriegnty account, but suggests that it is incomplete. While “the people” in society may control their political organs at the state or federal level, they may also choose to exercise their “reserved powers” in the social realm of civil society through various associations. According to this understanding, the 10th Amendment is an expression of the role of civil society and its distinction from the constitutional organs of political society as a well as a statement of popular sovereignty.
In keeping with APSA’s theme of “promoting pluralism,” this paper reflects a pluralist understanding of the constitutional order as expressed in recent work such as John Inazu’s Confident Pluralism (2012), Jacob Levy’s Rationalism, Pluralism, & Freedom, and Luke Sheahan’s Why Association’s Matter (2020). According to this line of thinking, various constitutional provisions, such as the Assembly Clause, are understood as providing protection for social pluralism and especially civil society institutions. By thinking about “the people” of the Tenth Amendment as the social realm broadly understood, this paper considers how the founders and the founding documents anticipated developments of the understanding of civil society as articulated by Alexis de Tocqueville and other nineteenth century thinkers.