Mutual Optimism, Relative Power, and Conflict (Pre-Recorded)

• In Event: Causes of War (Pre-Recorded)

Abstract

I reconsider the question of whether and how mutual optimism about military prospects might explain armed conflict, using a mechanism-design approach adapted to specific features of anarchical settings (no third-party enforced commitments). Understood as a matter of degree rather than as a yes-or-no quality, mutual optimism appears as a powerful cause of costly conflict when parties perceive large enough stakes. More optimistic parties choose to run more risk of getting committed to fight. In addition, the approach yields new and potentially testable results on the relationship between observable measures of the balance of power and the risk of conflict. When small changes in relative power have a large effect on conflict odds, conflict is more likely in the optimal mechanism when power is roughly balanced. When defense is more advantaged in the sense that one needs a larger imbalance in forces to get a good chance of winning, the risk of conflict may be zero for an interval around 50-50 and highest for an intermediate imbalance of (ex ante observable) factors. Alternatively, relative defense dominance can make the risk of conflict insensitive to the observable balance of forces, except at the extremes.

Author

• James D. Fearon, Stanford University