The Political Economy of Assassinations

• In Event: Criminal Politics in Brazil

Abstract

In recent years, hundreds of mayors, city councilors, and candidates for these positions have been executed in countries as diverse as Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, and others. In order to investigate the conditions under which such violence arises, I use a unique and original dataset of political executions in Brazil. This project is the first to link official homicide data to a registry of political candidates, enabling the identification of local politicians assassinated over time. I argue that politicians use violence against other politicians when bargaining over the spoils of office breakdown. I test how factors that increase incentives for these contracts through corruption affect the likelihood of assassination. Additionally, I test how access to corruption impacts the likelihood of political killings using Brazil's anti-corruption program. Audits reduce future opportunities for corruption by highlighting the legal costs of corruption and the likelihood of getting caught. Empirical evidence shows that municipalities that have been audited in the past display a lower likelihood of assassinations. My results suggest that violence against politicians can be another perverse effect of corruption.

Author

• Mariana Carvalho, University of California, San Diego