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When and how does the US compel other countries to join its economic coercion efforts? International cooperation, especially through IO's, presents a trade-off: It raises the chances of success, but may require the US to modify its goals and compensate its partners' losses. Previous work has not explored these ideas due to the lack of adequate empirical measures. We address this gap using highly disa ggregated trade data and, with our novel measures, test the dynamics of "weaponized interdependence" in the sanctions context. We first show that the US prefers to impose sanctions unilaterally unless its economic power over the target is low. Then we study how the US compensates its partners during multilateral sanctions. Specifically, we test whether a partner's "usefulness" (i.e. leverage over the target) or "vulnerability" (losses from target retaliation) is a better predictor of US compensation. Our findings speak to the broader debates on how the US approaches international cooperation in the economic arena.