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Victim State Response Calibration to State-Sponsored Terrorism

Sun, October 3, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Background/ Puzzle: State-sponsored terrorism (SST) has for long been used as a tool by countries to inflict costs on rival states without direct confrontation, as the latter risks inviting limited to full-scale war. The literature on SST has so far focused primarily on the motivations, facilitating factors, and the timing of state sponsorship. What has been insufficiently studied, however, are the responses of victim states to SST. Why does state response to SST vary spatio-temporally under different governments, different leaders of the same ruling political dispensation in a country, and sometimes even under the very same leader in a state? Under what conditions does a state respond militarily as opposed to responding through economic sanctions, the use of diplomatic tools and lodging complaints with IOs/ fora, or hitting back in a Rapoport-esque tit-for-tat with their own SST? For instance, India demonstrated a variety of responses for different SST attacks on its soil between 2000 and 2020. The USA, Israel, as well as Turkey mostly adopted comparatively hawkish military stances against SST. On the other hand, the UK, however, only took economic measures against Libya for supporting the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) by freezing their assets within the UK.

Further, while other factors such as severity of SST attack may seem directly proportional to response, the case is often counterintuitive. One of the highest profile SST attacks on Indian soil (Mumbai 26/11), causing tremendous infrastructural damage and fatalities, only led to diplomatic isolation internationally of the state sponsor, Pakistan, by India. The then leader, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was moderate and perceived to be weak. On the other hand, even for relatively smaller SST attacks compared to 26/11, the current Indian right-leaning leader, Prime Minister Modi, chose as his response military “surgical strikes” in the sponsor’s soil. Therefore, one finds wide variation in terms of responses across rival dyads, both in terms of how victim states deal with terrorist groups as well as with the alleged state sponsors of terrorism. The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically ascertain the causes of this variation. The extant work builds on Byman (2005) to empirically test the reasons behind the varied responses of states to SST.

Theory: While the response is often the result of complex calculations by the victim state, I argue and empirically demonstrate that the variation occurs mainly because of a leader’s personality traits at a particular time. Basing my characterization of leadership traits based on Brown’s (2017) typology, I posit a theory hypothesizing what leadership personality traits should be more (or less) likely to deliver a military response to an SST attack versus a non-military, milder response.

Brown (2017) proposes a six-fold typology comprising three hawkish and three dovish decision maker types, distinguishing among them via differing operational codes, personality traits, hypothesized susceptibilities to cognitive errors/biases, and hypothesized foreign policy positions. Leader personality should explain response to SST because it is usually the more hawkish, right-wing type leaders that would be keen on responding aggressively in line with their personality traits, while dovish leaders would rather seek solutions beyond military aggression. Further, leader personality traits can change over time. For instance, leaders such as Israel’s Shimon Peres, who are cognitively open and complex, have transitioned across the hawkish to dovish political spectrum or vice-versa in their careers. I account for such changes using Hermann’s (1977) Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).

Other considerations such as nature of targets, timing of the attack (for example, before elections), domestic political mood in the victim state, and severity of attack may play some role, and I shall control for these in the empirical models. However, I assert that a leader’s personality trait is the main driver. Ergo, ceteris paribus, a change in leadership traits will result in change in the response.

Importance: This study is important because it explores a hitherto understudied area. Academically, this dissertation fills a lacuna in current research on terrorism and is generalizable across states. Little has been empirically ascertained as to why states respond to SST the way they do. Under what conditions do victim states use military force against state sponsors of terror? Which types of leaders are more (or less) likely to adopt such means? Addressing these academic questions, this study also concludes with broader implications and real-world lessons on the choices available to policy practitioners, to determine what responses to SST work best for countries.

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