Can Independence Induce Compliance in International Organizations?

• In Event: Domestic and International Institutions and Foreign Investment

Abstract

Can independence induce compliance in international organizations (IO)? Due to the potential trade and travel restrictions imposed by the international community, it can be costly for states to share disease outbreak information with the IO, making compliance a problem in the international surveillance of infectious diseases. This paper argues that giving more independence of information dissemination to the IO can induce compliance from states with a weak linkage to the international community. To test the argument, I examine how the International Health Regulation (IHR) reform of the World Health Organization (WHO), which grants the institution more independence to disseminate disease outbreak information, affects the number of Disease Outbreak News (DONs), an indicator of state's compliance. I find that that states with a closer linkage to the U.S. have more DONs reports before the reform. However, the reform increased the reports from states with a weaker linkage to the U.S. This paper shows the distributive consequence of independence and identifies a new mechanism of indirect influence of powerful actors in IOs.

Author

• Zoe Xincheng Ge, New York University