Who Succeeds?: Explaining the Politics of Succession in Hybrid Regimes

• In Event: Elites & Succession Under Democracy & Autocracy

Abstract

However powerful they may be, all leaders have a limited shelf life. Even the most omnipotent autocrats will eventually grow sick or old. Sooner or later they will no longer be able to hold office and will be succeeded by someone else. In democracies, transitions of political power are regulated by established norms and procedures that limit the range of possible outcomes. In non-democratic regimes, by contrast, anything can happen during a leadership succession. Succession crises, in fact, can be the curse of autocracies, even previously stable ones.

This article analyses the modes of succession in electoral authoritarian regimes, defined as regimes that combine elements of both democracy and authoritarianism (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Gandhi 2015). Modes of succession vary widely across cases in ways that are inadequately captured by the existing literature. Drawing on sixteen cases from around the world, the article offers a novel typology of succession. I propose that incumbents have four options for managing succession. In an “insider succession” a leader picks a politically well-known and long-standing ally to be his heir. Examples of this mode include President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine choosing his Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych, to run as his successor in 2004, Putin grooming Dmitry Medvedev to stand for election in 2008, and Ivory Coast’s President Alassane Ouattara’s choice of Amadou Gon Coulibaly. An altogether different mode, however, may be called the “dark horse succession,” wherein a leader surprises the political world by selecting a relative unknown as his designated successor. Examples include Hugo Chavez’s abrupt anointment of Nicholas Maduro, one of the least known figures in his group, as well as Boris Yeltin’s choice of Putin in 1999. A third type, “hereditary succession,” entails a leader sending a clear signal to other elites, usually many years in advance of a possible transition of power, that the next ruler will come from the leader’s own family. The passing of the presidential torch from Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev to his son is one example. Another is the present-day grooming of Serdar Berdimuhamedow by his father, the President of Turkmenistan. The fourth mode, which I term “succession evasion,” refers to situations where incumbents refuse to talk about succession, leaving the identity of a successor up in the air. Turkmenistan’s long-serving ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov, for instance, passed away without designating an heir. President Putin today may also serve to illustrate this mode.

Having laid out a typology of leadership succession, this article then demonstrates the costs and benefits of each to incumbent rulers, their political parties and other elites, and then explains why incumbents opt for one mode over another. One significant advantage of a designated successor is the clarity such a move provides regarding the eventual transition of power. The absence of an heir, by contrast, can lead to intense power struggles among elites (Franz and Stein 2017; Meng 2020). Naming a political heir, however, is not without potential pitfalls. In particular, the heir apparent may be able to amass independent power and forcibly hasten the incumbent’s departure (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). The fear of such a fate may explain why many autocrats refuse to name a successor (Herz 1952). Hereditary succession (Tullock 1987; Brownlee 2007) has its own appeal. But while a son may be less likely to turn upon his father, there is no guarantee that a hereditary heir will be fit to rule.

In elucidating why incumbent leaders choose a particular succession mechanism, the analysis considers actor-centered variables (e.g. incumbents’ age, health), institutional variables (e.g. strength of the dominant party, degree of elite cohesion) as well as socio-economic factors. Preliminary findings strongly suggest that the choice of succession strategy hinges on the expected response of the broader political elite, as well as the ruler’s public approval relative to the popularity of the dominant party.

This article makes three main contributions to the study of comparative politics. To the best of my knowledge, this article is the first to develop a typology of leadership succession in modern hybrid regimes. Second, while a number of studies examine the effects of leadership succession on regime survival (Cheeseman 2010; Zeng 2020), there has been little systematic explanation for the political dynamics that determine the mode of succession in the first place. Finally, the article speaks to the literature on the resilience and decline of electoral authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012).

Author

• Masha Hedberg, Colgate University