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This paper evaluates the relationship between revolutionary violence and one of the most common threats that new revolutionary governments face: counterrevolutions. An influential line of scholarship has argued that popular movements embracing non-violent tactics of civil resistance are both more likely to successfully depose autocrats and more likely to build long-lasting regimes. I show that, in fact, non-violent revolutions are far more susceptible to being toppled by counterrevolution than revolutions that embrace armed insurgency.
The paper draws on an original dataset of counterrevolutionary challenges (n = 99) following 123 episodes of revolutionary regime change from 1900 to 2015. These data reveal that of the twenty-two successful counterrevolutions that have occurred since 1900, twenty of them occurred following non-violent revolutions and two following violent ones. Statistical analyses also demonstrate a robust relationship between various measures of revolutionary violence and the likelihood of a successful counterrevolution. Further analyses allow me to unpack the mechanisms behind this relationship: I find that revolutionary violence does not lower the likelihood of a counterrevolution being attempted, but it does lower the likelihood that a counterrevolutionary challenge will succeed. I argue, based on these findings, that violence during the revolution lowers the likelihood of counterrevolution not because it depletes the coercive capacity of the old regime, but rather because revolutionaries build their own loyal and competent coercive force, which they may then deploy to protect their new regime.
I further unpack the mechanisms behind these statistical relationships with a brief paired comparison of two revolutions that occurred in relatively short succession in the same case: Cuba’s 1933 revolution (a non-violent democratic revolution that was reversed through a counterrevolution) and its 1956 revolution (a socialist revolution waged through guerilla insurgency that successfully defeated a US-backed counterrevolution). Using process tracing techniques, I demonstrate the importance of a loyal and capable revolutionary army in explaining the different outcomes across the two cases.