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Despite the lack of formal, transparent succession institutions, the Kim family in North Korea and the al-Assad family in Syria have ruled their countries for many decades. Can weak institutions promote autocratic survival? This paper looks at one of the weakest succession institutions---the norm of primogeniture in ancient monarchies. I first examine the evolution of social norms and conceptualize the norm of primogeniture as an equilibrium emerged from repetitive interactions among the royal family and the elite. I theorize that the norm of primogeniture promotes political stability for two reasons. First, it reduces uncertainty after the demise of the incumbent and provides the elite assurance that their loyalty will be rewarded in the long run. Second, the norm of primogeniture has normative factors that can constraint and shape the behavior and interests of the autocrats and the elite. Using a new dataset covering 357 monarchs in 17 states in ancient China during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States eras (771--221 BCE), I find that the norm of primogeniture reduces a monarch's risk of being deposed by the elite. I also provide tentative evidence that primogeniture facilitates state building in ancient China. Furthermore, I show that a similar pattern persists in today's autocracies: leaders in authoritarian regimes that practice some type of primogeniture face lower risks of being removed from office by the elite compared to leaders in military, personal, and party regimes, as well as monarchies that do not practice primogeniture.