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From work on federal policy responsiveness to public opinion we know policy adoption is a function of public support, but public support does not translate one-to-one into policy change due to considerable status quo bias and the need for supermajorities to enact legislation in the U.S. system with two legislative chambers and a presidential veto. According to Gilens (2012), proposals supported by about half of the public have a one-in-three chance of becoming law. It takes about 90 percent support to exceed a 50 percent chance of adoption. Among the surest circumstances to block passage is opposition by wealthy subgroups.
In this project, we examine the public’s beliefs about responsiveness. Do people understand that narrow majorities are rarely enough to produce policy change? In two initial experiments conducted on MTurk, we measure people’s beliefs that legislation will be adopted given different levels of public support and minority opposition from different social groups.
In the first experiment, we ask respondents the percent chance a proposed (unspecified) policy change will pass. Respondents were randomly told that either 5, 10, 25, 40, 50, 60, 75, 90, or 95 percent of the public supported the change. Their beliefs that policy will pass correspond very closely to the extent of public support. These responses reflect naïve majoritarianism: public support translates into perceived chances of adoption almost one-to-one.
In the second experiment, we estimate whether the nature of opposition to a policy with majority support affects beliefs that it will pass. In the control condition, respondents are asked how likely a proposed Adopt-A-Pet commemorative license plate that is supported by a majority of the public will pass the legislature. In the treatments, respondents are informed that a majority or men, women, wealthy people, wealthy men, or wealthy white men oppose the policy. Without mention of opposition, respondents are again very optimistic: 77% of them believe the policy will pass. The reported likelihood that a policy will pass drops to roughly 50% across treatment conditions. The decrease in the likelihood of passage is particularly large when opposition comes from the wealthy.
The first experiment and the control condition of the second both show belief in high responsiveness, but this perception is not resistant in the face of opposition, even when the stated minority opposition comprises as little as 1% of the population. Against majoritarian expectations, respondents optimistically view the percentage of public support as a proxy for passage but pessimistically change their beliefs in the face of any explicit opposition, regardless of the size of the opposition.
Our initial experiments used a convenience sample and questions that stripped away institutional features. In our next round of data collection, we intend to analyze information about different institutional provisions affects respondents’ reported beliefs. Respondents’ perceptions of whether a policy will pass may vary when considering federal vs. state law-making. An emphasis on bi-cameralism's requirement for approval in two chambers or the potential for a filibuster in the Senate may affect respondents’ perceptions of government responsiveness to public opinion. Making institutional features salient to respondents will allow us to estimate the extent to which the public perceives them as limits on responsiveness.