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It is known that democratic states often attach human rights clauses to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with authoritarian states, and that these clauses are at least sometimes effective in reducing repression (Hafner-Burton 2011). I revisit the link between human rights and trade agreements by shifting focus to the preferences of authoritarian signatories. As autocracies are increasingly joining global trade institutions, states such as China have become more skilled at trade negotiations and are playing a more active role in shaping the content of PTAs. Since autocracies often have a continued interest in repression, I assess whether they may use trade agreements as a vehicle for undermining human rights norms. This paper proposes three specific mechanisms through which autocracies use trade agreements to weaken human rights: (i) strategic partner choice; (ii) inclusion of provisions that legitimize repression; and (iii) selective enforceability. First, autocracies prefer to sign trade agreements with other nondemocratic states in part because this allows them to avoid human rights conditionality. More specifically, increasing trade linkages between autocracies imply that there are more opportunities for autocratic states to select likeminded PTA partners. Similarly, autocrats with closer trade ties are better able to share resources and expertise in repressing domestic opposition. Secondly, I hypothesize that dictators sometimes use non-trade provisions in PTAs to legitimize domestic repression. To illustrate this point, I provide evidence from the use of anti-corruption and anti-terrorism provisions included in PTAs. Finally, I argue that where autocrats sign PTAs with human rights clauses, these often lack legal enforceability, whereas non-trade provisions that are more beneficial to dictators are more frequently binding. Overall, I suggest that this is concerning because trade agreements can be highly legitimizing. However, some of these effects might be mitigated by existing agreements involving democratic trade partners. My theory is supported by empirical analysis of autocratic PTAs from 1950-2012.