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The number, complexity, and breadth of international institutions has grown dramatically in the last 40 years. These international institutions often overlap in function, both across and within issue areas. This paper offers an explanation for why states create redundant institutions and examines their effect on policy. I argue that redundancy is a strategy used by states to protect against potential loss caused by institutional instability. Through the use of redundancy, states create two types of insurance mechanisms: standbys that function only if primary institutions break down and scapegoats that bear the blame for poor performance of primary institutions. I empirically test the implications of redundancy theory in the context of dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) in international trade agreements. The findings highlight two attributes of overlapping institutions. First, redundant rules embodied in separate organizations serve different purposes depending on context. Second, redundancy creates institutional hierarchy. These two features of redundancy imply that conflict among myriad institutions is not an inevitable outcome of regime complexes.