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The US Congress routinely pushes the acquisition of military technology above and beyond the requests of the US military. The general sense in the literature is that this occurs because Members of Congress, particularly those on military committees, funnel or preserve funding to military systems that are built in their districts. However, more recent American politics scholarship gives us reason to doubt the influence of Committee membership on funding disbursement (Berry and Fowler 2018, Grimmer and Powell 2013). I reexamine the relationship between Congressional Committee Membership and in-district defense expenditures, using new historical data from a natural pseudo-experiment that occurred when House Armed Services committee gained line-item authority over specific military systems in the 1960s. I find no relationship between a committee having power over a system, and the geographic distribution of that system’s contracts. I extend this with a causal analysis of defense allocation through the modern era, using Barry and Fowler’s differences-and differences design and Grimmer and Powell’s Congressional Committee Exile mechanism to examine the causal influence of committee membership on defense allocation. My results suggest that we need to rethink the dominance of parochial interest in our explanation of Congressional defense policy.