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Economic Crises and Media Freedom Under Authoritarian Regimes

Fri, October 1, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

When economic crises strike, why do some dictators clamp down on media freedom, while other dictators loosen restrictions on the media? I argue that authoritarian regimes reduce media freedom in response to moderate economic downturns, while expanding media freedom in response to major crises, because the latter cannot be effectively concealed through censorship. When an economic crisis is not particularly severe, citizens may be unsure whether their personal economic misfortunes are shared with other citizens across the country. In these situations, censorship can typically prevent citizens from acquiring common knowledge of the crisis, averting mass protest against the regime. However, the government may be unable to use censorship to hide an extremely widespread and severe crisis from the public. Faced with a sufficiently large crisis, the benefits to ruling elites of extensive censorship may no longer be worth its costs. In addition, if a major economic crisis forces the government to offer significant democratic reforms to placate citizens, reducing restrictions on the media can make such reforms more credible. I test this theory for authoritarian regimes around the world during the last three decades, using exogenous economic shocks – including contractions in global GDP growth, decreases in the global prices of commodities a country exports, increases in the global prices of its imports, and unusually high or low rainfall in a country’s territory – to instrument for declines in countries’ per capita GDP. Using cross-national measures of media freedom from VDEM, Freedom House, and other sources, I test the hypothesis that media freedom in a given country will tend to decline after a moderate economic shock but improve after a large shock.

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