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Does the formation of nonaggression pacts lead to an increase in violent repression within allied states? While previous research has demonstrated that nonaggression pacts are effective external conflict management tools in that they reduce the likelihood of violent conflict between former antagonists, a systematic analysis of their role as internal conflict management devices has yet to be conducted. In this paper, we therefore develop a theory linking the formation of nonaggression pacts to relations among the state and internal groups after the resolution of an antagonistic relationship. We contend that although nonaggression pacts facilitate the peaceful management of relations between signatories, they engender conflict (mis)management within allied states. We specifically argue that upon the formation of a nonaggression pact, new allies increase their use of violent repression against the following groups: 1.) internal dissident groups that were previously supported by the former adversary; 2.) internal groups that were once cooperative in the struggle against the one-time opponent but persist in challenging the signatory’s new ally; and 3.) internal dissidents more generally, as freed up coercive capacity allows governments to direct their power inward. To test our theory, we evaluate changes in repression levels after a nonaggression pact is signed and, holding other factors constant, expect to see a significant decrease in respect for physical integrity rights. We also provide qualitative evidence from a case study analysis of the 1982 South Africa-Swaziland nonaggression pact to assess our mechanisms in a more rigorous manner.