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Market Power, Institutions, and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Wed, September 29, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

What are the effects of market power opportunities on the development of economic institutions in the domestic political economy? When do market power opportunities create incentives to use coercive force as a mechanism for seeking and maintaining price-setting capabilities or rents? We examine these processes in the political economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo to shed light on the role of market power politics in the onset of and ongoing civil conflict. We argue that when price-setting opportunities are absent, firms and states coordinate the development of economic institutions designed to maximize economic efficiency. When firms or other economic actors find incentives to gain power over the markets within which they operate, however, coordination breaks down and market power replaces efficiency as the goal. Under these conditions, coercive violence becomes a more likely tool of establishing or maintaining market power, leading to an increased probability of civil conflict.

We contrast two markets within the DRC to illustrate this comparison. The first market –hot beverages¬– presents little or no market power opportunities for economic agents. Here we [hopefully] note the role of the state in enhancing production and export infrastructure for farmers the supply chain. The second market –cobalt mining– provides ample opportunities for market power. As a result, the state is unable to organize firm efforts around efficiency of production and export, and instead we see violence as a tool of establishing or maintaining control over the cobalt export market.

By comparing two markets within the same state and at the same time, we highlight the role of market structure and market power politics in the motivation for civil conflict.

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