Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
There is widespread concern today that much of the public is misinformed, holding factually inaccurate beliefs that they believe to be correct. However, few studies to date have measured the certainty with which political beliefs are held. Those that do often use methods that cannot meaningfully distinguish actual beliefs from uncertain guesses and have led to differing conclusions about the prevalence of certainty in inaccurate beliefs. In this paper I introduce a new measure of certainty that provides meaningful context to existing self-report measures of certainty and adjusts for differential item functioning (i.e., differences in how respondents use response scales). I show that past work exaggerates the degree to which the public is misinformed and that inaccurate beliefs are four times more likely to represent uncertain guesses than actual beliefs. I then provide the first empirical test of the widespread expectation that certain beliefs are more likely to resist correction and influence attitudes than uncertain ones. The findings presented here have implications for how researchers interpret findings from the growing body of research that documents and attempts to correct misperceptions.