Political Parties and Violence Specialists: Explaining Violence in Karachi

• In Event: Political Causes and Personal Consequences of Violence: Research from South Asia

Abstract

When do political parties pursue violent strategies despite their potential electoral cost? Why do some engage in violence directly while others do so through intermediaries? This paper argues that where ethnicity is politically salient, parties making ethnic appeals to voters will not suffer an electoral penalty for using violence. However, unlike literature which argues that violence polarizes the populace in electorally beneficial ways, I emphasize instead the economic and coercive benefits of violence for parties. Whether a party engages in violence directly or not depends on its organizational strength. This paper focuses on two cases in Karachi, Pakistan: the Muttahida Qaumi Movement—which orchestrates violence through its cadres—and the Pakistan People’s Party—which outsources violence to distinct specialists. I support my argument using survey experimental and qualitative evidence, including interviews with party members, elected officials, journalists, and police officials, as well as observation of party meetings and events.

Author

• Niloufer Siddiqui, SUNY, University at Albany