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The last two decades have seen a rapid increase in state military cybercapacity among
world powers and in the developing world. Yet how states decide to initiate the development
of their military cyberapparatuses is a poorly understood phenomenon. Why have some
states decided to assign existing military agencies to deal with cyberthreats whereas others
jump directly to creating new military cybersecurity units? Viewing the global spread of military
cybercapacity as an example of capacity diffusion, I argue that this choice depends on the
type of signal a nation wants to send to its allies. The responses to allied behavior follow the
logic of complementarity. If the country’s allies signal toughness by creating new units, then
the country may not need to do so and assigns cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing
military agency. But if the country’s allies take a softer approach by assigning cybersecurity
responsibilities to an existing military agency, then the country has an added incentive to create
a new cybersecurity agency in order to signal toughness. To test this argument, I construct
a new cross-national time-series data set on state cybersecurity organizations for the 1999-
2018 period. The analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument. My
findings have important implications for the study of national security policy.