Individual Submission Summary
Share...

Direct link:

The Benefits of Weak Allies: Burden-Sharing and the Dilemmas of Alliance Control

Fri, October 1, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

U.S. policymakers from Eisenhower to Trump have sought to encourage greater levels of defense burden-sharing by American allies, yet have often recoiled at the prospect of allies actually becoming more self-reliant. Most recently, the Trump Administration expressed concern about efforts by European allies to coordinate more in their own defense, including through the creation of a European Defense Fund, fearing that the Europeans might use their own defense cooperation as a substitute for NATO. I argue that these seeming contradictions reflect a dilemma inherent in military alliances: that of control versus cost-sharing. Burden-sharing enables the United States to reduce its own costs, but can come at the expense of its ability to exert influence over its partners. As such, U.S. officials are ambivalent about seeking contributions from the very allies which have the greatest potential to share its burdens -- allies with larger economies -- due to their ability to become self-reliant. I provide evidence for these claims using cross-national data on defense spending in U.S. military alliances between 1950 and 2010, as well as qualitative evidence from Japan, South Korea, and West Germany. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom on alliance burden-sharing informed by the "economic theory of alliances," which holds that larger allies necessarily over-contribute relative to their size.

Author