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For nearly three decades, Beijing leaders have insisted that the 1992 Consensus be the sole basis of stable cross-Strait interactions. Also known as “one China with respective interpretations,” the Consensus is a tacit understanding, presumably reached between Beijing and Taipei when the KMT was in power, that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are parts of “one China” subject to different views of what “one China” really means. This is an “agree-to-disagree” formula that allows the imagination of Taiwan’s eventual unification with the Chinese mainland but sidesteps the sovereignty issue. While being controversial, the Consensus has received the majority of Taiwan citizens’ support, particularly during the period of 2008-2016. In a nod to the party’s pro-independence supporters, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has refused to endorse the Consensus since she won the 2016 presidential election. After Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly equated Beijing’s one China with the Consensus in a major policy speech in 2019, Tsai has doubled down her position. Tsai’s refusal of the 1992 Consensus appears to reflect Taiwan citizens’ sentiment and help her re-election bid in 2020. Indeed, observers generally believe Xi’s message has revived the political fortune of a candidate it disapproves because Tsai’s electoral prospect was rather uncertain at the end of 2018. Is this fair assessment? What are the effects candidates’ positions on the 1992 Consensus on Taiwan voters’ electoral choices? What are the implications to cross-Strait relations?
To address these research questions, this study will draw on the theory of symbolic politics and analyze data collected from a survey which was completed two days before the election. Special attention will be placed on the younger generation, defined as age 35 or younger. Implications to Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-Strait relations will also be analyzed.