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In representative democracies, few speakers speak louder or more authoritatively than representatives themselves. Fewer still have a more durable impact our public discourse. This paper argues for viewing electoral representation as democratic infrastructure of the public sphere and investigates the normative and epistemic consequences of electoral institutions’ role in shaping what representatives communicate to publics. I argue that so far as electoral institutions encourage representatives to focus their energies on courting decisive constituencies, electoral competition yields discourses that disproportionately reflect those constituencies’ perspectives and interests at the expense of strategically marginal ones. Such inequalities harm strategically marginal citizens by denying them equal participation in official discourses. When electoral inequalities overlap with other inequalities of social power, these harms constitute a democratically perverse form of epistemic injustice. Mitigating the epistemic side effects of electoral competition, I argue, places stronger demands on the institutional design of electoral competition than typically recognized.