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Quality, Quantity, & Credibility: Concessions & Demobilization in Moscow, Russia

Fri, October 1, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In authoritarian regimes, protests can function as an alternative to institutionalized consultation: protests convey information about grievances to the government, which may then respond by promising to change policy in the future--in other words, a concession. However, given the commitment problems inherent to authoritarian regimes, protesters may see concessionary promises as cheap talk, rather than credible attempts to address their concerns. In what contexts do protesters view the promise of concessions as a satisfactory response to their demands? I argue that concessions should be more likely to demobilize protesters, first, when they address the core grievance that motivated the movement, and, second, when they are announced by higher-ranking officials. I test my argument using an original dataset of concessions that is part of the Protest Campaigns of Moscow database, which documents protest activity directed at the municipal government of Moscow, Russia, from 2013-2018. I show that higher quality and more numerous concessionary promises, as well as promises made by higher-ranking government officials are associated with a longer lag between demonstrations. This demobilization is not the result of repression at protests. However, the incidence of smaller events that do not require mass participation is unaffected by concessions. This suggests that, while average protesters may view concessions as the successful resolution of their conflict, a committed core of activists do not.

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