Taxes in the Time of Revolution: A Survey Experiment During Algeria’s Hirak

• In Event: Economic Attitudes and Perceptions

Abstract

We present an online experiment offering novel support for the rentier theory concerning how regimes with substantial fuel resources shore up support during crises. We fielded the survey to 4,796 respondents during the height of Algeria’s Hirak protest movement in 2019, which successfully forced the authoritarian ruler, President Bouteflika, to resign. In the survey, we embedded an experimental treatment involved randomly providing some respondents with information about how much money they likely saved due to the Algerian government’s fuel subsidies. We found that the treatment improved significantly respondent’s perceptions of government performance, including providing employment, health care, ending corruption and maintaining stability. By contrast, we found more limited support for behavioral changes, such as complaining to a government official, although some respondents in the treatment group did report a lower willingness to protest. We believe these results demonstrate the type of support that regimes with strong fuel subsidies can maintain even during revolutionary periods, as well as the limitations of this form of rentierism.

Authors

• Robert Kubinec, Princeton University

• Helen V. Milner, Princeton University