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Principal-agent theories of political accountability point to information asymmetries between citizens and government officials as one of the most important obstacles to achieving better governance. Accordingly, many civic education interventions seek to inform citizens about government officials' performance and duties in the hopes that citizens will reward and sanction officials to incentivize better performance. But in contexts where mechanisms for sanctioning poorly-performing officials are weak, empowering citizens may instead create antagonism that leads officials to retreat and citizens to disengage. Through a field experiment in the northern Philippines, we test whether another approach - training citizens and officials together as a means of promoting constructive engagement - is more effective than training citizens alone. Our findings indicate that training officials jointly with citizens does not make them more responsive to citizen feedback. On the contrary, officials in the joint training condition were less likely to include citizens in decision-making fora and citizens trained joint with officials were less satisfied with officials’ performance and responsiveness. We argue that accountability interventions that increase citizens’ monitoring capacity may have unintended consequences in the absence of credible sanctioning mechanisms.