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The “hard” British exit (Brexit) concluded by the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) – with its end to European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction in the UK and a trade agreement that relies on reciprocal retaliation rather than judicial dispute resolution – constitutes the EU’s first case of the “disintegration,” where a long-standing institutional order has broken down and become reversible. In this paper, I argue that this outcome is a dramatic case of backlash against a court that had long expanded individual rights against the preferences of member states. While most legal and political observers date rising politicization associated with ECJ rulings to a recent, post-Enlargement period, national governments long contested expansive ECJ case law that tried to reduce discrimination against EU workers. I show that popular distrust of the Court emerged in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty, which introduced the concept of EU citizenship and led the ECJ to expand rights to equal treatment for mobile EU citizens who were not economically active or financially independent. Resistance to this case law usually resulted in decoupling in the form of progressive social rights with limited implementation in practice. The unusual opportunity of an EU membership referendum offered British voters a chance to act on their distrust of the ECJ by “taking back control over our laws,” but the ECJ also suffers a crisis of confidence in a majority of member states, including all wealthier western states with net intra-EU immigration flows, with the exception of Belgium.