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How do militant movements consolidate power in fragmented civil conflicts? The proliferation of rebels and militias is a prevalent feature of modern civil wars, insurgencies, and weakly governed spaces. While a spate of recent scholarship has systematically studied the causes and consequences of militant fragmentation, the reverse process, in which power that is dispersed among many non-state armed groups becomes concentrated among one or a handful of factions, has been neglected.
In this framing paper, we introduce a new research program around the puzzle of militant consolidation, the process of increasing concentration of power within a set of subnational armed groups. We discuss three pathways to political and military consolidation: (1) cooperative consolidation occurs when a faction grows consensually through alliance formation, mergers, and political coalitions; (2) competitive consolidation is the process by which a group gains power or influence by outcompeting other factions for fighters, popular support, and external sponsors; and (3) coercive consolidation occurs when one group violently eliminates rivals or compels them to submit to its authority.
We explore three variables that are likely to shape consolidation strategies. The first pertains to permeability, which refers to the
ability of individuals to join or switch between different armed groups in a designated movement. We expect permeability to be high in movements of the same ethnicity, religion, sect, and tribe. Low barriers to defection imply the existence of a common identity and potential interconnecting social networks that can facilitate cooperation and cohesion across co-ethnic/coreligionist rebels. We hypothesize that high permeability increases cooperative consolidation. The second relates to territorial control. As with states, territorial control provides armed groups with natural resources and revenues extracted from the populace but also requires that groups defend their territory. If a group controls territory, then preserving and expanding that territory vis-à-vis rivals is likely to maintain and grow its power. Additionally, an armed group can increase its power by capturing a rival’s territory or by drawing the support of its fighters and population. We posit that the high importance of territorial control increases coercive consolidation. Lastly, the third variable is the state sponsor's motivation for rebel victory. State sponsors are vitally important to militant movements. However, the motivations of state sponsors can vary across conflicts or over time. Some may value rebel cohesion while others prefer to hedge by having several viable militant actors compete against each other. Thus, we hypothesize that high state sponsor motivation for rebel victory increases cooperative strategies of consolidation; conversely low state sponsor motivations invites competitive and coercive strategies of consolidation. We present preliminary qualitative cases and cross-national data to support these propositions.