Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
How did cooperative consolidation of factional armed groups take place in Ukraine since 2014? This paper analyzes three simple models, all of which illuminate different strategic problems associated with U.S. support for Ukrainian military consolidation processes: a two-player bargaining model (pitting The West against Russia), an N-player coalition formation project (pitting many Ukrainian social factions against each other in competition for state spoils), and a principal-agent model (pitting a great power military principal against an imperfectly incentivized local agent). Taken in tandem, these models make predictions about Western foreign assistance to Ukraine. The upshot of the first model is that flows of Western aid to Ukraine will never drop to zero. The upshot of the second model is that foreign aid can be repurposed to keep the incumbent Ukrainian regime in power – and, knowing this, non-territorial militias have strong incentives to organize themselves into "blocking coalitions" to maximize rent extraction from the central state. The upshot of the third model is that military assistance ought to take the form of training and advising to monitor the Ukrainian military and minimize agency problems. Model predictions are evaluated with qualitative data and descriptive results from an original survey of militia members.