Violence, Peace, and Intervention in Illicit Drug Markets

• In Event: Domestic Origins of Conflict

Abstract

Can governments indirectly control drug trafficking-related violence? I develop an infinitely repeated game-theoretical model of the core strategic interaction between multiple drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the government, in the presence of a highly profitable illicit market. In the model, the government can decrease the discount factor of the DTOs, which paradoxically increases the range of parameters under which peace can be sustained as an equilibrium. The model explicitly shows how some proposed strategies in the literature might not be incentive compatible for governments, and how democratic countries can have a harder time curbing drug trafficking-related violence. The model also illustrates how the U.S. can shape foreign anti-drug law enforcement through foreign aid, military support, and strengthening the rule of law in producing and transit countries from where illicit drugs are smuggled.

Author

• Martin Castillo Quintana, NYU