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Relations between countries are often volatile, thus shifting inconsistently between cooperative and conflictual acts. Yet present studies often overlook volatility, focusing instead on what makes relations either more cooperative or more conflictual. Indeed, while studies of change in IR abound, they mostly focus on change that follows specific patterns—studying, for example, conflict getting progressively more violent (escalation) or reoccurring at set intervals (cycles). As a consequence, volatility remains understudied in this field, especially when compared to other fields of inquiry (i.e., voters’ behavior, election outcomes, economic growth, etc.). This paper argues that volatile states’ behavior is the outcome of an interaction between dynamics unfolding both at the domestic and the international level: the unbridled competition among domestic groups and a state's relative power superiority. Thus, rather than being dismissed as capricious behavior on the part of powerful states, volatility should be understood as the outcome of a classic political struggle for resource redistribution. This paper tests its main theoretical contention against plausible alternative explanations leveraging data on rivals and allies. While we mostly think of these relations as either cooperative or conflictual, this research shows that they often switch inconsistently between cooperation and conflict. Understanding volatile change, therefore, helps us depict a more complex, more realistic picture of current international arena.