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Consent has, at different points throughout history, served as both a necessary and sufficient requirement in several key realms of human existence. In authority to govern, medical practice, and sexual interaction, consent is akin to autonomy or freedom: “consent to be governed,” “informed consent,” and “enthusiastic consent” all mean recognizing the right to protect one’s bodily integrity and choose one’s own course of action. In ideal conditions, where power is distributed either fairly or equally, consent can reflect an individual’s autonomy and choice to ultimately determine their own life’s direction. However, in nonideal conditions, consent to govern one’s own isolated actions is often curtailed by social factors that make one vulnerable or susceptible to domination or exploitation. At the same time, those that seek to protect those deemed vulnerable may do so mistakenly by barring opportunities for consent, presuming them less able to consent than they actually are.
This paper traces the trajectory of these three areas of consent theory in order to show that while consent is often endorsed as the first guiding principle when demarcating moral human behavior, it soon becomes complicated when understood within the context of broader systems of power. Thus, while consent remains an ideal, the job of defining what consent looks like must be a deliberative and engaged moment, or even at times a replacement model for consent.
First, in the realm of political authority and governance, John Locke and others in the social contract tradition advance a theory of legitimate statehood based on the “tacit consent” to govern. And, here, contract theory has become phased out in deference to other frameworks for government pivoted around democratic rule and equality of power. Recognizing that consent is often systemically unavailable to the dominated, or at least vulnerable, groups, democratic theorists turned then to either redistributing or creating power through procedurally fair or instrumentally beneficial mechanisms as necessary requirements for legitimate rule. Contract theory then became replaced with democracy.
In medical care and research, “informed consent” has formed the backbone of all doctor-patient interactions and human subject research protocols, affirming the right of the patient to choose their own particular course of treatment and participation in experimentation. However, ethicists also worry that consent to participate in genetics research, database inclusion, and testing is perhaps impossible, or at least significantly difficult to attain for minority or indigenous populations that have historically been, or currently are, systemically coerced and exploited by medical institutions and subjugated in the name of genetic research findings. In particular, many fear that informed consent to genetics research is impossible given the unknown future of using data collected today. Thus, researchers are often understandably nervous about even the ability of consent being given, and therefore do not push forward in their research. However, many groups may actually want this research done, just under different conditions and with new intentions. The practice of deliberative engagement has and can continue to help both doctors and researchers in this realm as well as the affected populations to navigate complex power dynamics and understand what it would look like to ethically, and legitimately, participate in genetics research.
Finally, in the domain of sexual contact and communication, “enthusiastic consent” has become the new standard requirement, replacing previous paradigms of male entitlement. And like in governance and medicine, recognizing nonideal states of power inequality allows us to understand better the impossibility of certain groups of people to give consent in certain circumstances or relationships. By identifying the inability of an employee to consent fully to sex with their employer, for example, we demarcate certain necessary structures of relationships that are based on the capacity to dominate due to unequal power and vulnerabilities, rather than freedom. In parallel, groups of individuals who previously were not allowed to consent to certain kinds of sexual contact, such as sex workers or those who receive payment for sexual interactions, have been better able to harness the opportunities of democratic opportunities for engagement that allow them to articulate their rights to recognition and legal protections akin to those in other labors and industries.
In an unideal world, we must create institutions that mimic ideal situations as close as possible by including voices previously marginalized to be able to attest either to their inability or desire to give consent in areas previously misunderstood. Democratic engagement, by amplifying the voices of those without power, better reveals the proper conditions under which consent can be given, and may even replace the whole previous paradigm of decision-making authority.