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More than ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, which sparked America’s Great Recession, it is still unclear why no high-level bank executives were prosecuted for criminal fraud. This question is perplexing given that many powerful executives faced jail time during the Enron-era accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s. This sense of injustice Americans felt in the wake of one of the biggest economic disasters of their lifetimes has had reverberating political consequences, such as populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and populist political campaigns from Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in 2016. Many have offered seemingly plausible explanations, such as campaign donations and political connections buy freedom from prosecution. However, these explanations fall short because wealthy campaign donors existed in the previous crises where they did face jail time for their fraudulent behavior. The clubby atmosphere between Washington and Wall Street, and presidential decision-making have also been cited as popular explanations. I ultimately reject them as less compelling explanations in favor of the internal incentive structure of the Justice Department itself and external incentives for prosecutors. Prosecutorial discretion is an under appreciated and under studied topic in political science literature, considering its vast power and importance to American society. The discretion prosecutors have to bring cases and the incentives they face are important areas of study for American justice and societal equity.