Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Why do democracies sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs)? BITs are commonly thought to deter direct expropriation, a concern investors often have toward autocratic host states for foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that expropriation concerns also drive the formation of BITs in democracies, but due to indirect expropriation, or regulation. Democracies, when acting as host states for FDI, sign BITs to generate a credible commitment against future regulation of foreign investment. However, this preference is split along partisan lines. Right-wing parties prefer attracting FDI to the creation of new regulations. Left-wing parties prefer the inverse. Right-wing parties–when in power–join BITs to provide a credible commitment to investors that unnecessary regulation will not occur in a future, potentially left-wing, administration. We test this argument quantitatively with original data on BIT signature and ratification. We also examine how investors use a BIT’s investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanisms after ratification. In line with our general theory, we expect investors to sue democratic host states more frequently when a left-wing party is in power. Our initial findings provide general support for these propositions. The argument adds to our understanding of the domestic politics of international cooperation and how variation within democracies can affect international relations.