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The Liberal Tradition

Sun, October 3, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the liberal tradition in political thought was born out of an effort to respond to two important 19th-century developments. On the one hand, the democratization of social and political relations made it clear that the power that we exercise over each other in modern societies is reciprocal, insidious, and ubiquitous. As a result the importance of carving out a domain of behavior in which we’re not answerable to the state or to each other for what we do took on a new salience. This explains the liberal commitment to what I call market freedom; to promoting a flexible and entrepreneurial economy, a robust and pluralistic civil society, and an open and tolerant public sphere. On the other hand, the industrialization of economic production exposed a fundamental tension between the dependence that we experience in our private lives and the independence that we’re expected to display as citizens. As a result the problem of securing the material and social conditions for self-government took on a new salience. This explains the liberal commitment to what I call republican freedom; to promoting economic independence and security, shared or reciprocal power in “private” domains like the workplace and the family, and equal influence over political decision-making.

This analysis has three important implications for our understanding of the liberal tradition.

First, by calling attention to the internal complexity of the liberal conception of freedom, it helps us to see that the central aims of a liberal politics are often at cross purposes: promoting economic security often means regulating, and thus reducing the flexibility of, the economy; combating private power often means regulating, and thus reducing the pluralism of, civil society; and securing equal political influence often means regulating, and thus reducing the openness of, the public sphere. Liberalism is fundamentally a balancing exercise, and this is why the liberal tradition is so diverse and open-ended.

Second, by placing the origins of the tradition in the 19th century this analysis displaces John Locke from his familiar role as a (or the) “founding” liberal, and sidelines Immanuel Kant, the philosopher who had the greatest influence on John Rawls, and thus on the development of contemporary academic liberalism. This is not to deny that earlier thinkers have been incorporated into the liberal tradition, but simply to emphasize that their incorporation was retroactive, as 19th and 20th century liberals drew selectively on intellectual precedents that could be used to support their cause.

Third, by focusing on the tension between republican and market freedom, this analysis allows us to sort anti-liberals into two basic groups: those who deny that republican and market freedom are important political values – authoritarians of various stripes – and those who hold that one or the other of them is a sufficient political value taken in itself – utopians of various stripes. We can draw a further distinction within the latter group between socialist utopians, who embrace republican freedom to the exclusion of market freedom, and market utopians, who embrace market freedom to the exclusion of republican freedom.

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