Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This paper compares the political representation of religious minorities in the earliest modern parliaments in England, France, Imperial Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, and contrasts the exclusion of religious minorities from the earliest English (post-1688) and French (post-1789) parliaments with their inclusion in the earliest imperial Russian (post-1905) and Ottoman (post-1908) parliaments. It argues that the (dis)enfranchisement of religious minorities was causally linked to the significant variation in the trajectories of democratization in these polities, both during the initial transition to democracy and especially during democratic consolidation. While framing the autocratic elites’ decision to allow for or fight against democratization as the critical factor in explaining the variation in regime trajectories, as some other recent works have done from a political economic vantage point focusing on concerns over redistribution of land and wealth, this paper shifts the focus to redistribution of religious identities’ relative standing in political hierarchies. Thus, the threat of upsetting the rank order of different religious or sectarian identities that found their expression in multiple parallel societies, each with a different “way of life,” rather than the threat of economic redistribution, posed the more insurmountable barrier against the transition to and consolidation of democracy in its early stages. The paper also clarifies that the political representatives of the religious and sectarian minorities that are discussed in this paper were not necessarily seeking secession at the time, and hence cannot be depicted as rival nationalisms as often claimed retrospectively in the political historiography of imperial Russian and Ottoman polities. In the last section, the paper extends the same logic to provide a preliminary explanation for the democratic breakdown in interwar Europe.