Division and Decision: The Politics of Unilateral Military Action

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Abstract

In historical perspective, presidents have frequently directed the use of military force without explicit permission from Congress. Yet, presidents still court legislative approval on select occasions. Why do presidents sometimes seek congressional authorization and other times—indeed, most of the time—do not? I argue that presidents seek authorization for military force to overcome institutional constraints on direct military action. On most occasions, these constraints are weak, thus affording diplomatic and military efficiency priority over democratic legitimacy. Counterintuitively, divided government and political polarization may at times encourage authorization-seeking in an environment with weak executive constraints. I ground these arguments with historical illustrations and a case study of the Persian Gulf War.

Author

• Katherine Irajpanah, Harvard University