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It is well-established in the literature on issue competition that parties seek to compete on issues they ‘own’. Yet, less attention has been paid to what strategies parties employ to avoid issues they would prefer not to compete on. This paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the avoidance strategies available in party competition on issues that parties wish to make less salient to voters. Empirically, this is tested using the wedge issue of European integration. We analyse an original dataset of over 200,000 statements on the EU by mainstream party leaders in national parliaments between 1989 and 2019, and use automated text analysis to demonstrate that mainstream parties in government and opposition employ different avoidance strategies. The findings show that mainstream government parties are more likely to use an avoidance strategy that defuses EU integration through the use of complex technocratic language. In contrast, mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that ignores EU integration. We also show that when wedge issues are successfully mobilized by challenger parties, mainstream parties stop ignoring the issue but continue to avoid it with alternate strategies of avoidance. Our findings have important implications for the literature on party competition and democratic representation.