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How were newly enfranchised women mobilized? I argue that the mobilization of women on average required more effort, which reduced politicians' incentives to mobilize them. Building on elite models of mobilization, I theorize that the extent of women's under-mobilization depends on the type of an electoral system and local level of political competition. Under SMDs, politicians had an incentive to mobilize a greater share of women in the most competitive districts. Under PR, parties had an incentive to mobilize a greater share of women in the most uncompetitive within-district localities. I provide support for the theory using sex-separated turnout data after the introduction of women's suffrage and PR in Norway and then demonstrate generalizability of my results using sex-separated election data from five additional elections in three additional countries. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that suffrage `automatically' spurs politicians' electoral interest in new electorates and therefore improves group representation.