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Dual Moral Obligations and International Cooperation

Fri, October 1, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Conventional accounts of international cooperation suggest that states decide whether to cooperate based on their national self-interests. Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories of cooperation, for example, explicitly assert that states are self-interested in national survival and economic wellbeing. Constructivist theories, while allowing states to deviate from their material self-interests, nevertheless assume that states care about their ideational self-interests, such as national pride and cultural identities. Drawing on research in moral psychology, this article challenges the conventional view that state decision-makers intend solely to maximize their national interests, whether material or ideational. Research on moral circles and universalism indicates that human decision-makers often attach some, albeit varying degrees of, intrinsic value to universal entities such as all-humanity and the environment. The weight that a decision-maker attaches to universal entities depends on ideational factors, for example, ideology (conservatism or liberalism) and political values (survival values or self-expression values). While liberal decision-makers with high self-expression values emphasize universalist issues such as environmental protection, conservatives with survival values highlight parochial interests such as national security and national pride. This, however, does not mean that decision-makers do not care about other issues on the parochial-universal spectrum but simply implies that they attach more weight to some sets of issues than others. Decisions over international cooperation should thus be reconceptualized as a tradeoff between one’s "dual moral obligations" to the “national interest” and “greater good,” although such moral obligations are not equally strong. Based on this key insight, this article proposes a "dual moral obligations" theory of international cooperation. It develops a formal model in which two unitary actor states cooperate for a common good, each attaching different weights to their own national interests vis-a-vis the shared good and predicting the other side's weight function. Each side also calculates their own and the other side's costs and benefits from cooperation and non-cooperation considering the relative weights given to parochial and common interests. If both sides give little weight to the common welfare, the situation will likely approximate a Prisoner's Dilemma, where neither side would choose to cooperate. As the two sides increase their value for the shared good, their chances of cooperation also increase. However, the underestimation of one's counterpart's value of the common good discourages one from cooperating and reduces the prospects for mutual collaboration. In other words, failure to acknowledge other states’ altruistic motives may hinder cooperation. Another theoretical insight is that the appearance of states choosing in favor of their national interests is not evidence that states are entirely self-interested but rather a result of their trade-off between parochial interests and the greater good. As states commonly give priority to their national interests, their choices create the impression that they are completely self-interested. In sum, the model shows that traditional national-interest-based theories may underestimate the real potential for international cooperation and that the expansion of decision-makers' moral circles is conducive to greater international cooperation.

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