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Networks are ubiquitous in international relations and have underutilized potential for understanding linkages and structure amongst and between states and nonstate actors. International networks vary in their actorness (states, firms, NGOs, and individuals), hierarchy (hierarchical, non-hierarchical), size (the number of actors), and density (relative connectivity of network nodes). Recent advances in IPE (e.g ‘Weaponized Interdependence’) with respect to networks focus exclusively on hierarchical, private networks, which have been subsequently weaponized by state actors (Farrell and Newman, 2019). We build on and broaden the Weaponized Interdependence framework by identifying three theoretically distinct characteristics of networks, formation processes, network structure, and density, with implications for international collaboration and order. First, networks structures either emerge from public (state-led) or private-sector led initiatives, originally created by a state or a non-state actor. Second, networks can either be hierarchical, with one or few actors possessing more network power/influence than other actors, or non-hierarchical, with actors possessing similar network power/influence. Third, the networks can either be dense, with many connections between nodes, or less dense, with fewer connections between nodes. We find that these variations have an impact on the likelihood of network weaponization, which networks actors attempt to weaponize the network, how the weaponization of the network unfolds, and the relative awareness of weaponizing actors regarding second order effects and unintended consequences. Importantly, we find that instances of weaponization, across all types of networks, are frequently unsuccessful in achieving statecraft goals and that these instances come with significant unexpected second and third order effects for the weaponizing actor. This raises questions about the utility of weaponizing networks as an effective tool, especially to reach statecraft goals. To illustrate this, we draw upon cases of states weaponizing networks in various industries, such as the energy, defense, and pharmaceutical industries.