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The Relationship Between Anxiety and Liberty: Epicureans & Stoics vs. Hobbes (Pre-Recorded)

Fri, October 1, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

This paper engages with ancient thought which inspired Hobbes, to argue in what ways Hobbes differed from the Epicureans and Stoics in his view to the path to happiness and how to attain it politically; with both the ancients and Hobbes agreeing in happiness being the end. I argue that Hobbes was concerned with happiness (felicity) and that security, which appears to be the primary goal of Hobbes, was a precondition to the ultimate end of felicity. Given that scholars have written about the indebtedness of Hobbes to Epicureans (Strauss 1953, 168–69; Tuck 1988, 29–31; Friedle 2012; Abizadeh 2018, 139–42; Paganini 2004) and Stoics (Tuck 2014, xiv–xv), I elaborate on the meaning of the Epicurean and Stoic notions of the relationship between freedom and anxiety, vis a vis. my interpretation of Hobbes’s ideas on the relationship between anxiety and freedom and the political solution of each as to how to attain that freedom. The paper will examine the Straussian claim that the Epicureans can be argued to be apolitical in their approach, which Hobbes later politicized. (Strauss 1953, 169)
The Epicurean view leans on the side of talking about two greatest fears which plague men with anxiety – the fear of death and the fear of Gods and the question for Epicurus was how does one do away with them to live a life of tranquillity. The solution of Epicurus laid out not only in his writings but best articulated through his disciple Lucretius (On the Nature of Things), was to give up desires. Epicurean philosophy focused on maximising pleasure and minimising pain, by giving up desires, the fulfilment of which can lead to pleasure and the lack of fulfilment thereof to pain. That is the only way to overcome anxiety, which for the Epicureans was the fundamental obstacle to happiness, and thereby remains a challenge. (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus). As opposed to the Epicureans and Stoics, Hobbes understood human nature to be concerned with the pursuit of desires, which are limitless. (L: 23-25: 38-40; 47-48: 70-71; 62: 88-89). And because anxiety was generated by desire and fear combined, (L: 52: 76) it could not be solved by giving up desires.
The Epicureans, however, were also critical of another form of collective life: politics and considered its pursuit the source of anxiety due to the desire for public office. (Paganini 2004, 113–14) The Stoics such as Epictetus and Seneca also considered separating themselves from politics a fine solution and this can be understood better by Epictetus’s advice to minds – freedom consists only in what is in one’s control and what is not so, must not be seen as the realm of freedom. (Epictetus, The Manual) I will argue that Hobbes’s politics was ‘apolitical’ in the sense of the Epicurean apolitical view. The latter argues that freedom from anxiety consists of separating oneself from politics. However, instead of a separation, which Hobbes identified wasn’t plausible, the Hobbesian ‘apolitical’ consisted of achieving freedom by providing a mechanism of perfect political control by giving up control to the sovereign. Absolute liberty as experienced by individuals in the state of nature was entrusted in the sovereign. (L: 109: 149).
So whereas, for Epicureans and Stoics, freedom consisted in focusing on what one can control and thereby one had to give up desires to overcome anxiety; for Hobbes freedom consisted of being able to pursue one’s desires, which are inherently ridden with anxiety. Contrary to the ancients, freedom/liberty for Hobbes thereby was about expanding what one can control, controlling what one cannot control, rather than only focusing on what one can control and giving up the desire for the rest.
One important objection which can be raised to my argument is that liberty is understood by Hobbes in negative terms as the absence of external impediments, (L: 64: 91; 107: 145) and not as a nebulous pursuit of desires. However, the former is liberty in the commonwealth, whereas the latter is the meaning of liberty in the state of nature, or what is known as natural liberty. Hobbes defines the liberty of subjects the way he does to eliminate the anxiety which will inevitably follow with the pursuit of natural liberty. My argument will build on the Skinnerian argument that although Hobbes appears to be arguing for a negative theory of liberty, even in the commonwealth, there is nothing to suggest that the meaning of liberty doesn’t remain consistent with our natural liberty to pursue our wills and desires. (Skinner 1996, 157) A further important objection could be that anxiety is a term used too scantily and direct textual evidence for connecting it to the concept of liberty in Hobbes is unbecoming. However, I connect anxiety to liberty, by connecting the two definitions both of which, involve the pursuit of desire, for which there is abundant textual evidence. Human nature in Hobbes is explained as wanting to pursue desire and the consequences which result from this pursuit.

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