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When Lineages Meet Power: Elite Competition and Rural Governance in China

Tue, September 28, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Existing literature finds that when lineage elites gain political power, they become accountable to the public in some cases but extractive or predatory in other cases. This research argues that intra-elite competition, a parameter influenced by whether political elites come from the local dominant lineage and whether they belong to the same lineage, produces variations in governance outcomes. Using a four-round survey in rural China, we find that where there is less intra-elite competition between the dual village elites, villagers receive lower land-taking compensation and fewer agricultural subsidies, and the village public goods provision is less likely to meet the public’s needs. Three mechanisms are at work: collusion between village elites and the local government, and both the carrot and stick approaches where village elites buy off villagers and suppress collective resistance. The findings suggest intra-elite competition to be a defining parameter in examining interactions between formal and informal institutions.

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