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Taiwan Lobby in U.S. Foreign Policy (Pre-Recorded)

Tue, September 28, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

This study examines the factors that led to the Taiwan lobby's success in policy shift in the issue of granting visas to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in May 1995.
Taiwan lobby has demonstrated its policy impact by successfully getting Congress overwhelmingly adopt resolutions favorable to Taiwan, and despite opposition from the White House and the State Department, succeeded in getting the U.S. government to shift its policy of not issuing visas to Taiwanese high officials to visit the United States since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1979.
The success of Taiwan lobby is said to have inspired China lobby to learn the importance of lobbying the US Congress. For Taiwan lobby, which is said to be the second most influential lobby in Washington after Israel lobby (AIPAC), this was a case of the peak of its influence.
Why was “small power” Taiwan able to succeed in such a policy shift?
Most of the existing literature on Taiwan lobby have been focused on Taiwan’s lobbying activities from the 1940s to the 1970s, and they acknowledge a certain influence on U.S. foreign policy.
However, most of the analyses are descriptive in nature, using a historical approach, and have little explanatory power as a causal analysis of what specific type of lobbying led to policy effects(Policy shift).
Yu-Wen Chen analyzes five cases involving FAPA(Formosan Association of Public Affairs), a Taiwanese-American grassroots lobbying group, but does not cover this case. Chen points out that the influence of Taiwan lobby can be attributed to the acquisition of pro-Taiwan members of the US Congress and the resonance of norms. However, the correlation between how increased support in Congress led to policy change by executive branch has not been established.
This is in line with Thomas Risse-Kappen's theory that coalition building with key political actors in the partner country is important for foreign lobbies to produce policy effects. However, Kappen only points out the importance of coalition building, but does not indicate what kind of coalition building will produce policy effects or what kind of approach is effective for coalition building.
Therefore, this paper empirically analyzes the details of the Taiwan lobby's outreach to Congress and the US public opinion, empolying FARA(Foreign Agents Registration Act) documents and FEC political contribution data.
The analysis revealed that coalition building was the key to the success of Taiwan lobby. Specifically, the success of Taiwan lobby was based on (1) obtaining Pro-Taiwan legislators to propose legally-binding bills, and (2) obtaining support of majority members of both chambers to guarantee the effectiveness of the bills. In other words, it was a combination of coalition with Pro-Taiwan lawmakers through political donations and achieving the support of majority of Congress who support lobbying purposes consistent with the social norm of democratization.
The former is participation in the U.S. political process through political contribution, and the latter is resonance with U.S. norms. Both are the result of "Americanization," and for foreign lobbies to achieve policy effects in the US political structure, "Americanization" is important in both organization forms and lobbying objectives.

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